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I derive the value of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured 
alternatively by household member i’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the 
household, WTPi(H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, 
WTP(C). Households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient Nash bargains over 
one private good for each member, and one common household good. WTPi(H) is then found 
by trading off the public good against the household good, and WTP(C) by trading the public 
good off against the private goods. I show that WTPi(H) is on average a correct representation 
of WTP(C), but is higher (lower) than this average when member 1 has a higher (lower) 
marginal public good value than member 2. Pure and paternalistic altruism (the latter attached 
to consumption of the public good) both move each member’s WTP on behalf of the 
household closer to the true aggregate WTP, while only the latter raises aggregate WTP. The 
results have important implications for interpretation of results from contingent valuation 
surveys of public-goods. In a large sample, individuals tend to represent households correctly 
on average when asked about household WTP, and counting all members’ WTP answers on 
behalf of the household will lead to double counting.  
 
 1. Introduction 
     In contingent valuation (CV) surveys, questions eliciting respondents’ willingness 
to pay (WTP) for (small) increases in public goods provision are typically phrased in 
the following two alternative ways:
1 “How much are you willing to pay, on behalf of 
your household, for a (small) increase in the quantity of a public good?”; or: “How 
much are you, personally, willing to pay for a (small) increase in the quantity of a 
public good?”. A main purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between the 
answers to these two questions, in the context of a simple model of household 
behavior. A main result from the paper is that an individual’s true WTP on behalf of 
the household is identical to the sum of household members’ personal WTP levels, if 
and only if the two household members have the same marginal valuation of the pure 
public good in terms of the household good. When members value the public good 
differently, a given member over (under-) values the public good on behalf of the 
household when his or her value is higher (lower) than that of the other member. On 
average these values are however correct. In a large sample of respondents, individual 
household members will then represent the entire household correctly.  
     These results are derived within a model where each household consists of two 
members, each with (cardinal and selfish) preferences over three distinct goods: one 
private good, one household good consumed commonly within the household only, 
and one pure public good (consumed by all in society) provided outside of the 
household. The household has a given budget and determines its allocation in an 
efficient asymmetric Nash bargain. This solution yields a lower marginal utility of 
consumption for the household good than for the private good, with greater disparity 
for members with lower bargaining strength. The true aggregate household WTP for 
  2the public good can be represented by the sum of individual private WTP levels for 
the public good, in terms of each member’s own private good. Member i’s WTP for 
the public good on behalf of the household is instead derived considering this 
member’s willingness to give up units of the household good. 
    In section 3 I show that these basic results hold also under “pure” altruism among 
family members, where the utility level of each member enters into the utility function 
of the other. Given that both members are to pay their marginal valuations, overall 
valuations are not increased by altruism. Individual valuations on behalf of the 
household are however closer to true aggregate household valuation whenever they 
differ. In section 4 I instead consider “paternalistic” altruism where a given household 
member cares about the other member’s consumption of the public good. Then 
greater altruism implies that public-good valuations generally increase. Altruism also 
here makes one member’s WTP on behalf of the household more equal to the sum of 
individual WTP levels, much in the same way as under pure altruism. Section 5 
extends the analysis in the non-altruistic case to more general utility functions where 
the three goods are no longer strongly separable in consumption. I show that the main 
conclusions from section 2 (in particular, that the individual’s expressed valuation on 
behalf of the household is always correct on the average) then still hold. 
     This paper contributes to a resolution of a long-standing controversy and confusion 
in the CV literature, by showing that one household member tends to represent the 
household correctly given that households bargain efficiently over private and 
household goods. Although ignored by many family economists (such as Becker 
(1991)), several contributions on intrafamily allocation have considered efficient 
                                                                                                                                            
1 For a presentation of the CV method see Mitchell and Carson (1989). For an overview of recent 
applications and developments of the method, see Carson, Flores and Meade (2001). 
  3bargaining among family members.
2 The paper most closely related to this is perhaps 
Quiggin (1998) who studies household versus individual household WTP assuming 
that a purely private good is traded off only against a public good.
3 He then shows 
that high degrees of altruism are necessary to make individual and household 
valuations similar. In my model altruism is not essential for this conclusion. 
 
2. The basic model with no altruism 
     Consider  a  family  with  two  members, with an exogenous common household 
budget R (net of taxes), shared among purely private consumption Ci for members i = 
1,2, and a household good consumed jointly by members in the amount H.
4 The 
family budget constraint is then simply R = C1 + C2 + H. The two members bargain 
over C1, C2 and H in an asymmetric Nash bargain with relative bargaining strengths β 
and 1-β.
5 We initially disregard altruism, i.e., no element of other individuals’ utility 
or consumption enters into the utility function of a given member. Member i has a 
utility function which is strongly separable in its three arguments, of the form 
 
(1)                           U i =  ui(Ci) + vi(H) + zi(P), i = 1,2, 
 
                                                 
2 See Bergstrom (1997) for a survey. See also Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Aura (2002) for 
recent empirical evidence in favor of the household bargaining model. 
3 In Quiggin (1998) one interpretation of the “public” good is as a good consumed exclusively within 
the household. He however does not clarify the implications of this assumption for the equilibrium 
allocation of the “public” good, which is the main issue here. 
4 In our model “public goods” also comprise private goods whose costs are not charged to users, as is 
the case for many educational, health and cultural services. 
5 We ignore the possibility of family break-up or outside options yielding higher utility than our 
bargaining solution. A divorce option is considered by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and 
Horney (1981), and an “inside” noncooperative breakdown option by Lundberg and Pollak (1993). In 
our model the threat point is essentially immaterial as long as there is no breakdown of cooperation. 
Arguably, when household goods command a large share of the common budget, the divorce option 
may be unattractive even for spouses with low bargaining power, since this is likely to go together with 
low relative income when living as a single. 
  4where the ui, vi and zi can be viewed as cardinal (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility 
functions. They are increasing and strictly concave and fulfil standard Inada 
conditions, i.e., f’ > 0, f’’ < 0 and lim (A→0) f’ = ∞, lim (A→∞) f’ = 0, for f = u, v 
and z, and A = C, H and P, respectively. The Nash product will be expressed as 
 
      (2)                    [] [ ]
β β − + + =
1
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To derive the Nash bargaining solution, maximize the Lagrangian L(1) = NP(1) - λ(C1 
+ C2 + H – R) with respect toC1, C2 and H, to yield the first-order conditions
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Here the Ni are the Nash maximands (i.e., expressions inside the respective square 
brackets in (2)). Eliminating λ implies 
 




















                                                 
6 Asymmetric information about household members’ individual income contributions may complicate 
this problem relative to our exposition. Arguably asymmetric information is a small problem in 
households where members interact daily. It may e.g. be difficult for one member to maintain a high 
consumption level without the other member discovering this. 
  5where n = [(1-β)/β](N1/N2). n may be viewed as a “primitive” of the bargaining 
solution, and where we have used the normalization v1’(H) = v2’(H) = v’(H), for any 
equilibrium value of H.
7 When n→0, only member 1 has bargaining power; when n = 
1, both members have the same “effective bargaining power” (as under identical 
utility functions and β = ½); and when n→∞, only member 2 has bargaining power. 
(6)-(7) give the marginal rates of substitution between the private goods Ci and the 
family good H, under an efficient Nash bargaining solution. It is a standard 
(Samuelsonian) solution whereby the marginal value of the household (“local public”) 
good equals a (weighted) sum of marginal private-good values.
8 Generally, when β ∈ 
(0,1) (and thus n > 0), ui’(Ci) exceeds vi’(H). When R increases marginally, the 
amount of household goods H or private goods Ci increase. In the latter case 
household member 1 (2) however only receives a fraction 1/(1+n) (n/(1+n)) to spend 
on increased Ci. At an optimum the consumption value of increased Ci must equal the 
value of the increase in H. At an optimal solution the marginal utility of personal 
consumption must then exceed that of common consumption.  
     Face  now  member  i  with  the  question: “What is the highest payment you are 
willing to make, on behalf of your household, in return for a (small) increase in the 
public good P; i.e., what, in your view, is your household’s maximum willingness to 
pay (WTP) for such an increase in the public good?” For “small” changes this is the 
same as asking how many units of H member i is willing to forsake, to obtain this 
increase in P. We find this value to be 
 
                                                 
7 This is not a restrictive assumption, at least not locally in the vicinity of the preferred solution. Since 
the utility functions utilized here fulfil standard vNM criteria of invariance to an increasing linear 
transformation, we may without loss of generality normalize to set marginal utilities of common 
household consumption equal at this point. 
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WTPi(H) is here interpreted as household member i’s WTP for the public good on 
behalf of the household, i.e. in terms of H. 
      Denote  the  maximum  willingness  to pay for the public good in terms of the 
private good for household member i by WTPi(C), and the sum of the two by 
WTP(C). WTPi(C) is the correct answer to the question: “How much are you willing 
to give up, in terms Ci, for a small increase in P?” We find 
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From (6)-(7), WTPi(C) < WTPi(H) since ui’(C) > v’(H). We then have 
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where the latter equality is found using (6)-(7). The ratio of WTP1(H) to WTP(C), 
denoted R(1), is then given by 
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(11) leads to the following result. 
                                                                                                                                            
8 My model assumes that the “Coase theorem” holds for intrafamily allocations. In my view, if this 
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Proposition 1: Assume Nash bargaining over private and household goods, and no 
altruism. Then WTP for a public good, as expressed by household member 1 on behalf 
of the household, is greater (smaller) than the sum of the two household members’ 
private WTP for the good, if and only if member 1’s marginal valuation of the public 
good in terms of the common household good is higher (lower) than that of member 2. 
 
Proposition 1 implies that if and only if the two family members have the same 
marginal value of the public good in terms of the household good, any one of them 
expresses household WTP correctly. Perhaps surprisingly, this result is independent of 
altruism and of the relative bargaining powers of family members. It only depends on 
efficient Nash bargaining over private and household goods within the household. The 
result also implies that aggregating up individual WTP values stated on behalf of the 
household, across household members, always leads to double counting. This 
contrasts other work, in particular Jones-Lee (1992) and Quiggin (1998), where such 
double counting follows from altruistic preferences. 
     Certain generalizations are straightforward. First, with m>2 household members 
and a symmetric solution where each member has the same bargaining parameter 1/m, 
the sum of private WTP still equals one member’s WTP in terms of the household 
good given that members’ marginal valuations of the pure public good are identical. 
Secondly, in section 5 below I generalize to a more complex utility function where the 
three goods in question may be complements and substitutes in consumption, and still 
find quite similar results. Thirdly, while the model framework above is cardinal, most 
of the results readily generalize to an ordinal one where we only require efficient 
                                                                                                                                            
theorem is to hold approximately anywhere, this is likely to be in intrafamily contexts where the setting 
  8household resource allocation over private and household goods. The main difference 
is that the bargaining parameter n would then be indeterminate. Other main results 
(that one household member always represents the household correctly given that 
marginal rates of substitution between the pure public good and the household good 
are the same for both members; and that one member “on average” always represents 
the household correctly) will however still hold. 
 
3. Pure intra-household altruism 
     In this and the next section I generalize the above model in two directions, to take 
into consideration the possibility of altruistic preferences, of two different types. In 
this section I consider the case of only “pure” (nonpaternalistic) intrafamily altruism.
9 
Each household member now attaches utility to the general utility level enjoyed by 
the other member. The utility of household member i can then be expressed as 
 
    (12)          Ui  =  ui(Ci) + vi(H) + zi(P) + αi [uj(Cj) + vj(H) + zj(P)], i, j = 1,2, i≠j. 
 
Here αi ∈ (0,1) is a relative weight attached by member i to member j, relative to the 
weight attached to oneself. αi = 1 represents what may be denoted complete altruism, 
which we rule out except as a possible limit case. We may have α1 ≠ α2 whereby 
members have different degrees of altruism. The Nash product is now  
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is typically cooperative and individuals interact almost continuously.  
  9 
The Lagrangian L(2) is now formed in a way corresponding to L(1), and maximized 
with respect to the Ci and H under the budget constraint to yield 
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Again using the normalization v1’(H)=v2’(H)=v’(H), we find the first-order conditions 
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The new parameters αi here affect the intrafamily resource allocation, relative to the 
conditions (6)-(7) under no altruism. A marginal increase in P now has total utility 
effect zi’(P) + αizj’(P) for household member i (≠j). Differentiating (12) with respect 
to H and P we find member i’s WTP on behalf of the household as 
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9 We consider only intrafamily altruism. As justified e.g. by Becker (1991) and Jones-Lee (1992), this 
is likely to be the dominating type of altruism for a majority of individuals. 
  10To derive private valuations in this case, it now matters exactly how the valuation 
question is posed to the respondent. Consider the following two possibilities: 
1.  What is your private WTP for an extra unit of the public good, in terms of 
reduced consumption of your own private consumption good, given that you 
only, and not the other family member, is to pay for this good? 
2.  What is your private WTP for an extra unit of the public good, in terms of 
reduced consumption of your own private consumption good, when also the 
other family member pays his or her own private WTP for the good? 
Given that WTP for the public good is elicited from one family member, and only this 
member is to pay, the first interpretation may appear reasonable. WTP values, 
denoted WTPi
N(C), can then be found differentiating (12) with respect to Ci and Z 
(and holding Cj and H constant): 
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Aggregate household WTP is then found aggregating (20) over i, as 
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  11When instead all members of society are required to pay for increases in the public 
good, question alternative 2 is more relevant.
10 The WTP measure can then be derived 
from the equation set 
 
     (22)                 dP P z P z dC C u dC C u )) ( ' ) ( ' ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 α α + − = +  
     (23)                 dP P z P z dC C u dC C u )) ( ' ) ( ' ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 α α + − = + . 
 
Solving (22)-(23) simultaneously for dC1 and dC2 in terms of dP yields (9), as under 
purely selfish preferences. Aggregate household WTP then equals WTP(C) from (10), 
where WTP(C)<WTP
N(C).
11 Intuitively, when member 2 pays, member 1’s utility is 
reduced due to altruistic concerns about member 2’s reduced personal consumption. 
     WTP(C) will in the following be viewed as the true measure of household WTP 
for a small increase in P, as it involves simultaneous changes in C1 and C2 for the two 
household members such that both utilities are kept constant. We then have: 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that the analysis in section 2 applies except that household 
members exhibit pure altruism as defined. Aggregate WTP for the public good is then 
invariant to a change in the degree of altruism. 
 
    Compare now individual WTP on behalf of the household, to the “true” sum of 
individual WTP levels, WTP(C). Using (17)-(18), WTP(C) can be expressed as 
 
                                                 
10 A third relevant alternative, important in practical CV applications but not pursued here, is to base 
the WTP question on an assumption that all individuals are to pay the same amount toward the public 
good. 
11 This conclusion is identical to Result 1 in Quiggin (1998); see also Johansson (1994) for similar 
results.  
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The ratio of WTP1
N(H) to WTP(C), denoted R(2), is 
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We can now demonstrate the following result: 
 
Proposition 3: Assume that marginal valuations of the public good differ. Then one 
individual’s expressed marginal WTP for the public good, on behalf of the household, 
is closer to correct aggregate household WTP, the greater the degree of pure altruism 
for either member. 
 
This result is found differentiating R(2) with respect to the αi. Altruism here leads to 
averaging of marginal valuations across household members. The closer α1 and α2 are 
to one (the “complete altruism” case) the closer R(2) is to one when z1’(P) ≠ z2’(P).  
     Under  pure  altruism,  individual  expressed WTP on behalf of the household is 
always moved in the direction of true aggregate WTP, which is generally unaltered. 
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4. Paternalistic altruism with respect to the public good 
     In this section I consider “paternalistic” altruism, where the utility of each member 
depends on the other member’s consumption of the public good but no other goods.
12 
This can be relevant e.g. when P is a cultural or educational good and members care 
about each other’s “cultivation” or education level; or when P is health or 
environmental goods and members care about each other’s health state and longevity. 
The underlying motivation for the “altruistic” member may then be at least partly 
selfish.
13 Now the utility of member i is expressed as
14  
 
     (26)                        Ui = ui(Ci) + vi(H) + zi(P) + αi zj(P), i,j = 1,2, i≠j. 
 
The intrafamily resource allocation is unaltered by such altruism given that payments 
for the public good do not change. Thus (3)-(7) still describe this allocation. Member 
i’s WTP on behalf of the household is now given by  
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12 I here adopt Quiggin’s (1998) terminology; perhaps a better term would be “public-good focussed” 
altruism as used by Jones-Lee (1992) and as also suggested by a referee. 
13 We are ignoring possible selfishly motivated altruism related to personal or household goods. For 
household goods such effects could be present if increased consumption of common household items 
develops preferences that are more similar among family members, or improves the other person’s 
health status or longevity (as could be the case with a better dwelling, located in a safer and cleaner 
place, or better prepared common meals). For purely private goods, opposite paternalism is possible 
where one member prefers the other member to consume less of particular goods (as when the other 
member overeats, drinks or smokes, or spends time in some hazardous activity). 
14 (26) implies that the other member’s utility of public-good consumption (and thus not the 
consumption level) enters the first member’s utility function. This is a simplification which can be 
motivated if zi(P) represents member i’s actual use of a public good such as cultural or health services. 
  14The expression for aggregate household WTP, as the sum of individual values (in 
terms of the private good), is here WTP
N(C) from (21), as under pure altruism when 
question 1 in section 3 is evoked. Since WTP
N(C)>WTP(C), and this disparity 
increases in the αi, we have 
 
Proposition 4: Assume that each household member’s altruism is paternalistic with 
respect to the opposite member’s public-good consumption. Then household WTP for 




N(C), denoted R(3), given by  
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From (28), member 1’s WTP for the public good on behalf of the household equals 
true aggregate household WTP in the special case of (1-α1)z2’(P) = (1-α2)z1’(P). One 
also easily finds, from (28), that when α1 = α2 = α, an increase in α moves R(3) 
closer to unity whenever z1’(P) ≠ z2’(P); when α2 = 0, R(3) increases uniformly in α1; 
and when α1 = 0, R(3) is reduced uniformly in α2. A proportional increase in the 
degree of mutual altruism always makes one member’s valuation on behalf of the 
household more equal to true aggregate valuation, as under pure altruism in section 3. 
Now, however, when only the valuing member is altruistic, increased altruism 
increases that member’s valuation on behalf of the household, relative to true 
aggregate valuation. The opposite happens when the other member only is altruistic, 
and altruism increases. These cases are intuitively obvious. To take the last case, 
  15increased altruism does not change member 1’s valuation on behalf of the household, 
but increases true aggregate valuation, and R(3) drops. 
 
5. More general preference relationship in the non-altruistic case 
     A possible weakness of the formulation in the model above is the assumption that 
preferences are assumed to be strongly separable, between the three goods C, H and 
P. I will now consider the main implications of more general preference relationships 
for the two household members, over the goods C, H and P. For simplicity (and 
without much loss of generality) I now revert to the case of no altruism, dealt with in 
section 2 above. Assume that  
 
    (29)                                 Ui = Ui(Ci, H, P),   i = 1,2, 
 
where Ui is a standard (vNM) utility function, assumed strictly concave in Ci, H and 
P, which may generally differ between the two individuals. The Nash bargaining 
solution now has the same basic setup as before. The Nash maximands entering into 
the bargaining solution will here be specified as Ni = Ui(Ci, H, P) – Ui(0, 0, P), i = 1,2, 
and the solutions corresponding to (8)-(9) are: 
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Again the uH are normalized to be identical at equilibrium. Simplify also by setting 
cross second derivatives with respect to Ci and H, uiCH, equal to zero; other cases 
complicate without yielding further significant insights. The main new issue is how a 
  16change in P changes the bargaining solution and thus the equilibrium distribution of 
consumption between the two spouses. This in turn affects individual WTP for a 
changed supply of P. In principle such an effect could arise for two different reasons. 
First, relative inside bargaining positions of the two members could be affected. 
Secondly, outside options could be affected. Here we focus on the former effect. This 
implies an assumption (as in the main body of the paper above) that outside options 
are not exercised at equilibrium and that the inside utility level is always higher than 
the outside option level (e.g. from breaking up a marriage). 
     Consider now the effects of an increase in P on C1, C2 and H from changes in the 
bargaining solutions (30)-(31). Since such an increase in P leaves R constant, dH = -
dC1 -dC2, from (1). Differentiating (30)-(31) with respect to C1, C2 and H then yields 
the following approximate solutions:
15 
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15 These solutions are not exact since n, and thus the “effective bargaining parameters” 1/(1+n) and 
n/(1+n), are also generally affected, while in these calculations I take n to be a constant. The qualitative 
effects will however be correct. The reason is that the adjustments of the Ni and the respective effective 
bargaining parameters go in opposite directions. Thus when e.g. member 1’s net utility Ni goes up in 
the new solution, ceteris paribus, his or her relative bargaining strength is reduced somewhat to 
eliminate part of this increase. 
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is a positive determinant. While this solution appears rather complicated in general, 
we may illustrate its main properties by considering two relevant special cases. 
 
Case I: u1CP ≠ 0, u2CP = uiHP = 0, i = 1,2. Here the supply of the public good affects the 
marginal utility of private consumption for household member 1 but no other 
marginal utilities. In this case, (32)-(34) simplify to 
 








































Consider u1CP > 0, whereby an increase in the supply of P raises the marginal utility of 
the private good for member 1 only. This leads to higher private consumption for 
member 1, and to lower common household consumption and private consumption for 
person 2. The utility change for member i when P is increased can be expressed as 
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In the case considered here, the sum of the two first terms is positive for member 1 
and negative for member 2. Consequently, member 1 is willing to pay more for the 
increase in P, than what appears from the analysis in section 2 above. 
     Intuitively, the increase in marginal utility of private consumption for member 1 
makes it efficient for the household to also increase member 1’s private consumption 
(in order to fulfil the efficiency conditions (30)-(31)). As a more concrete example, 
consider the case where spouse 1 only is a potentially eager golfer, and the increase in 
P is the building of a public golf course nearby, making golf a new option. This raises 
the marginal utility of private consumption for the golfing spouse, leading the 
household to allocate more of the common resources to this spouse’s golfing hobby. 
(Thus in this particular case, spouse 1’s increase in utility due to a higher P is greater 
than that of spouse 2 for two separate reasons: first, because the direct utility effect, 
u1P, is much higher, but also because the indirect effect via the household bargaining 
solution is positive.) Examples where the marginal utility of private consumption is 
lowered when P is increased are perhaps easier to find. Assume that spouse 1 has a 
medical problem that requires private treatment in the absence of a publicly available 
treatment, and assume that the increase in P implies that such a public treatment 
becomes available. Then spouse 1’s marginal utility of private consumption is 
lowered, implying that the household is willing allocate less of its common resources 
to such costs for spouse 1. This implies that the overall utility change, and WTP, for 
spouse 1 is smaller than that found in section 2 (in the concrete example, though, the 
total utility effect of the change in P may still be much higher for spouse 1, which 
after all has the benefit of the treatment; the main overall positive effect for spouse 2 
may be that private and household consumption are raised). 
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Case II: u1HP ≠ 0, uiCP = u2HP = 0, i = 1,2. Here an increase in P affects the marginal 
utility of H, for spouse 1 only. The effects on consumption are now 
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Here a positive u1HP reduces C1, and increases C2 and H. Overall utility of private and 
household consumption is now reduced for member 1, and increased for member 2. 
This is the opposite of what was found in case I. Here, when the marginal utility of 
common household consumption is increased for member 1, the marginal utility of 
private consumption should also be raised for that individual. This in turn implies that 
overall private consumption must fall for that individual. (Private consumption will be 
raised for the other individual, since H is raised and (30)-(31) must still hold.) 
     Consider two concrete examples. In the first, assume that only spouse 1 suffers 
from noise or air pollution, and that the increase in P takes the form of reductions in 
such pollution. This reduces spouse 1’s utility from having an expensive house 
location (in an expensive neighborhood with low pollution levels to start with), or 
from taking strong defensive measures against pollution such as air filtering and 
window glazing. In this case u1HP < 0. The Nash bargaining solution then dictates that 
  20H be lowered (the couple moves to a less expensive location, or to a house with less 
defensive equipment). Private consumption for spouse 1 is increased (in order to bring 
the marginal utility of C1 down, in line with the reduction in the marginal utility of H 
for spouse 1). Then spouse 1’s utility, and thus WTP for the increase in P, are raised 
by these consumption reallocations. 
     In the other example, assume that a husband (member 1) benefits from his wife’s 
production of certain common household services, such as common meals or home 
cleaning, and that an increase in the public good reduces these benefits (while the 
effect is neutral for the wife; it could e.g. be the case that the husband now gets access 
to free meals or cleaning services with his empoyer, which makes him use there 
services instead of the previously-used common-household services). Then also here 
u1HP < 0, while u1HP = 0. By the same argument as above, the husband’s effective 
relative bargaining power is increased when the public good supply increases. His 
equilibrium utility is raised beyond that found under separability, and his WTP for 
increases in the public good raised accordingly, while the wife’s WTP is lowered. 
 
6. Conclusions 
     Efficient  household  bargaining  over private and common-household goods has 
important implications for how members of multi-person households tend to value 
public goods in contingent valuation (CV) questionnaire surveys. When one such 
member is asked to value a public good “on behalf of oneself”, this valuation is likely 
to trade off the public good against that person’s private-good consumption. When the 
person is instead asked to provide a public-good value “on behalf of the household”, 
the public good is instead likely to be traded off against common-household goods. 
Under efficient Nash bargaining between two household members, and provided that 
  21answers to CV questions are truthful, individual members always on average value 
the public good correctly “on behalf of the household”, in the sense that individual 
expressed valuation equals the sum of individual household members’ values “on 
behalf of themselves” on average. The member conducting the valuation overvalues 
(undervalues) the good on behalf of the household only when he or she has a higher 
(lower) marginal valuation of the public good than the other member. We also show 
that such over- or under-valuation is less serious under altruism, either pure altruism 
or greater mutual “paternalistic altruism” with respect to consumption of the public 
good.  
     These results have profound implications for the interpretation of results from CV 
surveys, which are today probably the most popular tool for valuing public goods. 
Most importantly, under my assumptions there is no basic problem with letting one 
person conduct such valuation on behalf of the household. In a large random sample, 
such valuations will, on average, correctly represent the respective households 
whenever they are truthful. Summing up individual valuations made on behalf of 
households across household members will then lead to double counting. Altruism 
plays no basic role in establishing these results. Still, higher degrees of altruism tend 
to make individual valuations within a household more equal, and one person’s 
valuation on behalf of the household more precise. 
          Several extensions can be interesting for future analysis. Further research is 
required to determine the relevance of the unitary, bargaining and conflict views on 
household allocation.
16 Secondly, many goods are on a more diffuse continuum, 
between our extremes of purely private or household goods. Thirdly, children and 
their preferences should be incorporated more directly, perhaps as individuals with 
                                                 
16 A recent study based on bargaining but emphasizing a conflict view is Anderson and Baland (2002).  
  22low bargaining power and sharing the common household budget, and subject to 
altruism (by parents). The analysis under either of the two altruism variants 
considered (or a combination) may then apply. Fourthly, altruism outside of the 
household may play important roles, not explored here. 
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